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ABSTRACT
This paper describes our preliminary investigations into identifying, and ultimately for-
malising, the wide range of social problem solving behaviour which can occur in multi-
agent systems. In particular, this work examines the different agent attitudes which may
prevail in social problem solving, the different types of individual and social commit-
ment which flow from these attitudes, how and why these attitudes come to prevail, and
how the attitudes lead to overall systems with radically different properties and
characteristics.
1. AGENT ATTITUDES & COMMITMENTS
To clearly delimit the extent of this work, this paper concentrates on the dynamics of
groups of autonomous problem solving agents who are engaged in cooperative problem
solving. We assume that each agent has been assigned a particular role in the collective
— the means by which this assignment is made (e.g. through centralised or decentral-
ised planning, through peer to peer negotiation, through the establishment of long-term
organisational roles, etc.) is not of concern here. Within this context, three distinct
types of agent attitude can be identified: (i) responsibility — agents only execute the
tasks directly associated with their role in the group; (ii) helpfulness — agents assist
others when they have no responsible tasks to perform (i.e. in their spare time); and (iii)
cooperativeness — agents assist one another in return for reciprocated support for one
of their own responsible tasks.Responsibility should not be confused with self-interest, it simply means that the agent
sticks steadfastly to its own obligations within the group and that it never reconsiders
this position. Thus when a group of responsible agents undertake a problem, each mem-
ber performs precisely its part—if one of the other agents runs into difficulty it will
receive no support from any of the others. Helpfulness and cooperativeness, on the
other hand, allow an agent to be supportive of a group member in its pursuit of its
responsible tasks. Thus if a problem is tackled by a group of supportive agents and one
of them runs into difficulty with its part, then one of the others may come to its assist-
ance. For this reason, supportive agents can be considered to be explicitly concerned
with the wider aspects and success of the group’s efforts as well as with their own indi-
vidual contributions.
For helpful agents, support is unconditional in that the agent doing the helping does not
expect anything in return. It helps because it has spare capacity. After allowing for all
its responsible tasks, the agent has the potential to do some additional problem solving
for the benefit of another agent if it so chooses. This, in turn, should improve the overall
performance of the collective’s endeavours. Helpful actions are undertaken because the
assisting agent perceives the benefit, either to itself or to the collective, to be greater
than the benefit of remaining idle. Two distinct types of help can be identified: reliable
and unreliable. With reliable help, the assisting agent knows to what extent (in terms
of time, resources and capability) it is able to assist another agent with its responsible
tasks. With unreliable help, the assistance is less predictable — the duration, resources
or capability with which the agent can help is unknown. Thus, for example, a reliable
helpful agent is able to commit itself to help another agent for a set period of time,
whereas an unreliable helpful agent may only be able to commit itself to help until it
receives a new responsible task. In terms of obtaining assistance for one of its respon-
sible tasks, an agent is able to predict more accurately the level of help which can be
provided by a reliable agent than it can for an unreliable one. In general, such knowl-
edge helps the agents to organise their problem solving, in terms of group creation,
group evolution, and group disbanding, more effectively in uncertain and unpredictable
environments.
For cooperative agents, support is conditional on receiving subsequent assistance from
the agent which is being helped. Cooperation is required either because the agent is
unable to fulfil its responsible tasks alone or because it decides, for whatever reason, to
assist another agent and consequently may be unable to honour its own responsibilities
alone. In the former case, the agent simply does not posses sufficient resources to com-
plete the task alone and therefore it must enter into an agreement with another agent to
provide the additional resources. Ideally the agent would prefer to receive this assist-
ance without having to commit its own resources (i.e. through a helpful agent),
however if such help is not forthcoming then it must entice another agent with the offerthat it will reciprocate. In the latter case, the agent offers assistance because it believes
that the benefit, to itself or to the community, is greater for the other agent’s tasks than
it is for its own. By the very fact that it has offered to support another agent, it may no
longer be able to fulfil its responsible tasks (even though it could have done so origi-
nally). In generating and evaluating cooperative proposals and agreements, agents can
take one of three stances: (i)non-risk taking:as long as the other agent honours its com-
mitment to provide the agreed level of support, the agent will be able to complete all of
its responsible tasks; (ii)risk taking: an agent does not know if it will be able to perform
all of its responsible tasks; (iii) altruistic: an agent knows that it will not be able to
honour all of its responsible tasks. An agent will adopt an altruistic stance when it
places greater priority on the goals of the others. It will adopt a risk taking stance when
it believes the only way of achieving its own goals is to obtain assistance from others—
in doing this it hopes that its own tasks will still be completed. An agent will adopt a
non-risk taking stance when it places greatest priority on its own tasks, but also has a
concern for the wider collective.
The main contribution of this work is to identify and characterise the different types and
levels of commitment which can occur in social problem solving. At one extreme there
is pure individual commitment, as exemplified by responsible agents performing their
own tasks. At the next level are commitments offered by helpful agents—unreliable
agents offer a one way, weak form of commitment (they renege as soon as they have
any responsible tasks to perform); reliable agents have a more predictable form of one
way commitment. At the highest level is the bi-directional commitments undertaken by
cooperative agents—non-risk taking agents renege if their own tasks become jeopar-
dised, risk taking agents may renege if their own tasks become jeopardised, and
altruistic agents never renege. We have found that these different levels of commitment
are needed if agents are to act intelligently and flexibly in dynamic and unpredictable
environments.
To provide a basis for discussing these social attitudes, a loading platform scenario in
which a number of fork lift trucks (agents) interact to unload lorries is used (section 2).
Section 3 shows how agents with different attitudes interact to give overall system
characteristics and section 4 outlines future work.
2. A MULTI-AGENT LOADING BAY SCENARIO
Lorries arrive randomly at a warehouse laden with goods which require unloading. The
warehouse has a fixed number of (un)loading bays which each hold one lorry at a time.
Upon arrival, lorries go to the nearest free bay. Lorries have an associated time by
which they must be discharged. Additionally, the warehouse tries to ensure that all lor-
ries are processed by some maximum time (Tmax). Since the aim of this work is toillustrate social problem solving behaviour, rather than to develop a real world solution,
we make a number of simplifying assumptions: all lorries take the same time to unload;
the time it takes one agent to unload a lorry is Tmax; unloading time is directly propor-
tional to the number of agents servicing a lorry (two agents will do it twice as fast as
one); and there are as many fork lift trucks unloading the lorries as there are bays in the
warehouse. The multi-agent system needed to solve this problem has two key objec-
tives: (i) all lorries should be discharged just-in-time for their deadline; and (ii) all
lorries should be discharged within the guaranteed maximum time (unless the specified
desired deadline is greater than Tmax).
One way of solving this problem is to assign a fork lift truck (agent) to each loading
bay—meaning each agent is responsible for a specific bay. Let Li be the lorry to be dis-
charged, Ai be the agent responsible for Li, and Ti be Li’s discharge deadline. This leads
to four distinct cases:
• Ti > Tmax:A i can discharge Li on its own and it has some spare time (Tmax- Ti)
in which it could support other agents.
• Ti = Tmax: Ai can discharge Li on its own.
• Ti < Tmax:A i needs support from other agents if it is to meet Li’s desired dead-
line. Without this support discharge will take Tmax.
• Ti = ?: No Li has arrived at bay i, hence Ai is free to support other agents
until Ti is defined.
If all agents were simply responsible, then the multi-agent system could be guaranteed
to meet its objectives as long as no lorry needed to be discharged in a time less than
Tmax. However, this situation could be improved if some of the agents adopted a help-
ful attitude. In this case, agents would support one another when they have a lorry with
a discharge deadline greater than Tmax or when they have no lorry at their bay. Help-
fulness would ensure the agents are more heavily utilised and that more deadlines less
than Tmax are met (simply because there is more agent problem solving power available
in the system).
The situation can be enhanced still further by the addition of cooperative agents. For
example, consider the case where two lorries arrive simultaneously. Lorry L1 has to be
discharged in time Tmax and lorry L2 in time Tmax / 2. If A1 and A2 cooperate, A1 could
assist A2 for the first Tmax / 2 units of time (meaning L2 is discharged in time) so long
as A2 agreed to assist it for the second Tmax / 2 units of time (meaning L1 is also dis-
charged in time). With only responsible or helpful agents, both lorries would be
discharged in time Tmax meaning L2’s desired departure time is not satisfied. Depend-
ing on the stance of A1 and A2, two types of commitment may be used to achieve thisform of cooperation— one-shot commitment in which the agents agree to assist one
another with a specific set of tasks; ongoing commitment in which the agents agree to
assist one another until a particular target state is achieved. The former involves a pre-
cise duration and level of resource, whereas the latter is open ended. If A2 is risk-taking
then it will agree to a one-shot commitment. The risk in this case, is that another lorry
will arrive at its bay while it is honouring its part of the agreement in assisting A1 with
L1. A1 is non-risk taking in this case because L1’s desired deadline will be met. If A2
is non-risk taking then it requires an ongoing commitment to perform this type of inter-
action—both agents commit to support one another while either of them are in danger
of not fulfilling their responsible tasks (the target state). Thus if a lorry arrives at A2’s
bay while it is assisting A1 with L1, then A1 must commit itself to help A2 clear the new
lorry, and so on. In the worst case, new lorries, with deadlines less than or equal to Tmax
plus the time the responsible agent is unavailable to start work, may arrive continuously
at A1’s and A2’s bays while they are supporting one another. Thus their ongoing com-
mitment will continue until: (i) no lorries arrive before the responsible agents fulfil
their duties at the other’s bay; (ii) one of the lorries has a sufficiently long discharge
time; or (iii) either agent receives the necessary support from some helpful agent.
3. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS & AGENT ATTITUDES
This work is concerned with the when, why, with whom, and how aspects of social
interaction. We wish to examine the beneﬁts for the individuals, for ad hoc cooperate
groups, and for the system as a whole. The when-aspect considers the conditions
under which interaction takes place; the why and to whom aspects are concerned with
the motivation for interactions and the agent interrelationships and dependencies; the
how-aspect covers the protocols used to govern the interactions and the nature of the
commitments and attitudes adopted while performing the roles. Space restrictions
mean we primarily cover the when and how aspects here, although other aspects are
brought in where appropriate. In the remainder of this section we consider exemplar
interactions involving the three distinct types of agent that we previously identiﬁed.
3.1 HELPFUL AGENTS OFFERING SUPPORT
Responsible agents can be helpful if they do not have a lorry at their bay or if there is
a lorry with a discharge time greater than Tmax. If an agent (H) ﬁnds itself in this situ-
ation, it may offer to help a responsible agent (R) which needs support in discharging
its lorry. H will offer to help if it is concerned with the achievement of the wider group
goal or if it believes that by assisting now it may receive some reciprocation in the
future. To determine which agent to assist a modiﬁed form of the contract net protocol[4] is used—in our case, however, the agent initiating the interaction is offering to
assist the others rather than seeking assistance from them. H sends out a help-
request when:
• it has ﬁnished discharging a lorry at its own bay and either no new lorry has
arrived or a lorry has arrived with a discharge time greater than Tmax (H has been
acting responsibly and now wants to act helpfully);
• it has ﬁnished discharging a lorry at one of the other agent’s bays and either no
new lorry has arrived at its own bay or a lorry has arrived with a discharge time
greater than Tmax (H has been acting helpfully and decides to continue in this
vein because there is no reason to become responsible gain).
Responsible agents unable or unsure (in that they are currently receiving unreliable
help) about discharging their lorry in time will respond to this offer. If H receives more
than one response it must decide whom to help. At its simplest level, H may choose to
assist the agent which is in most need of its support. Alternatively more complex strat-
egies which factor in information about the distance between R’s bay and H’s current
location and previous experiences of social interactions with R (e.g. if R helped H
before then H may decide to return this favour) may also be used. Having made its
selection, H sends an accept message to the agent it has decided to support and
reject messages to the others. If no R needs support to meet its deadline, H can
decide to remain inactive or support an agent with a deadline which it can meet alone
but which could be shortened by having more agents working on it. In the latter case,
this non-crucial help may be worthwhile because discharging a lorry before its desired
departure time may increase the warehouse’s throughput.
3.2 RESPONSIBLE AGENTS SEEKING SUPPORT
A responsible agent (R) will actively seek assistance from other agents if it has a dead-
line that it cannot meet alone. R sends a support-request when:
• a lorry with a discharge time less than Tmax arrives at its bay immediately after
a discharged lorry left (R was acting responsibly and remains in this role);
• a lorry with a discharge time less than Tmax arrives at its bay while it is sup-
porting another agent (R was being unreliably helpful, but dropped this support
to fulﬁl its responsible tasks).
• an unreliable helpful agent has withdrawn its support and the lorry in R’s bay
can no longer be unloaded by its desired deadline (R was being assisted with its
responsible task by an agent which withdrew its commitment, R needs to ﬁnd
new support).
• it is engaged in an ongoing cooperative commitment and a lorry arrives at its
bay with a discharge time less than Tmax plus the time it is already committed tosupport another agent (R is a cooperative agent and remains in this role with
respect to the ongoing commitment).
Helpful agents respond to support-request messages if they are idle or engaged
in non-crucial help. Responsible agents who are prepared to enter into a cooperative
agreement (either one-shot or ongoing) may also respond.
If R receives multiple replies, it must decide from whom it will get the most suitable
support. This can be determined by examining the following preference ordering:
i) Reliable helpful agent who can assist for exactly as long as is needed;
ii) Reliable helpful agent who can assist for longer than is needed;
iii) Several reliable helpful agents who individually have less time to support
than is needed but when aggregated together are able to provide as much time as
is needed (or more);
iv) Several unreliable helpful agents;
v) Cooperative agent(s).
R prefers the support of helpful agents, over cooperative ones, because it need not give
a commitment to support the other agent in return. To fulfil its responsible task without
having to reorganise its problem solving, R prefers the help of reliable to unreliable
agents since this is a more predictable form of interaction. R prefers as few agents as
possible to be in the collaboration because larger groups require greater communication
and coordination overhead. Finally, R prefers the exact degree of support, rather than
over support, because it is more globally beneficial.
Since agents operate in a concurrent and asynchronous environment, there are possi-
bilities that the ordering of certain events or messages may signiﬁcantly affect the
behaviour of the overall system. An important instance in which this can occur is
when agents have sent a help-request and additionally have responded to a sup-
port-request. A responsible agent who receives  bids  related  to  its  own sup-
port-request and also some help-requests should give help requests a
higher preference because these agents deﬁnitely offer unconditional help.
4. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
This paper identiﬁed several distinct types of social attitudes with regard to their voli-
tion to cooperation. A crucial part of this consideration was the type of commitments
the agents were willing or able to give one another and the way the agents reasoned
about and with these commitments. Our solution aims to enable the agents to ﬁnd a
balance between ‘behaving too cautiously’ and ‘harmful commitment overloading’
(agents committed to something they cannot fulﬁl). Our classiﬁcation contrasts with
other work [3] which has also highlighted different levels of commitment. Two com-munication protocols were described and their invocation was characterised by the
social attitude of the participants.
The loading platform scenario requires the agents to cooperate and coordinate their
behaviour to solve the overall problem in an effective manner. Our solution provides a
means of maximising the predictability of the agents and the system as a whole. The
scenario is powerful in that it provides ideas about cooperative scheduling and plan-
ning [1] as well as collision/conﬂict avoidance [2]. Its richness presents numerous
possibilities for studying different patterns of individual, group and social behaviour.
For the future, we are looking to put these preliminary ideas into a more general con-
text. We believe the agent’s motivation and the priorities it attaches to individual and
social goals are crucial determinants in governing individual and social problem solv-
ing. This is not only important for the individual decision making but also to predict
the behaviour of others and to react accordingly. We will further distinguish different
types of individual and social commitment, different strategies for preventing or mini-
mising commitment overload, different means of handling existing commitment con-
ﬂicts, different strategies for minimising the damage of dropping important
commitments, and strategies for improving trustfulness and reliance. We will also
describe more communication protocols to support richer forms of interaction. Finally,
the performance of the various agent types will be compared by means of experimen-
tal evaluation in the loading platform scenario.
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